Govt denied to issue warrants to US agents involved in distribution of weapons, says ISI Officer

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A foreign diplomat's involvement in illegal and non-diplomatic activities in the host country is a common phenomenon these days but in the light of Geneva Convention this matter seems to be highly crucial and certain rules were set about it in the documents of Convention. Before analyzing such activities of a diplomat, it is essential to put forth general relations and possible security threats that may be present between the diplomat's country and the host country. 

A second secretary of US consulate, namely Bob, resided in 7/4 sector of Islamabad. Our regular monitoring team reported us that in the later part of night, many Maliks and Khans used to come to meet Bob at his place in their expensive cars on daily basis. This report was even more important for us because of the fact that Bob's name was neither present in the ISI's list of contact officers in relation to Afghanistan, nor was he related to the anti-narcotics squad. For this reason, Bob had become a mysterious person for us. Neither did he have a wife nor children. He used to live alone in the bungalow. Moreover it was noticed that he frequently used to go out of the country. Two factors were critical in this case. Firstly the Afghan war. Ever since the war of resistance had started in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, the US had a dire wish to gain control of the war and subsequently render ISI's role as that of a 12th player. American diplomats always tried to meet the Afghan leaders first hand or used ISI as a ladder to reach Afghan leaders and wanted to give aid and funds to those Afghan leaders directly in order to keep them overwhelmed. ISI had to do special covert planning in order to keep US from these designs. Fulfilling this wish of America meant letting her hijack the entire Afghan resistance. 

Actually, the US wanted to take control of the Afghan resistance so that it could be easy to later plant a government in Kabul which would have been secular in totality. When Russian forces entered Afghanistan, we reported to the then President of Pakistan immediately. When he talked to America about the very matter, they were reluctant to accept it. It was impossible near them. But on the 3rd day when Afghan refugees began to move to Islamabad, Americans came to 'know' about Soviet occupation on Afghanistan. We are sure that Americans did know about the Russian invasion on Afghanistan beforehand but wanted to give us an impression as if this was unexpected for them.  Arrival of Russian armed forces in Afghanistan was undoubtedly a part of American great game. There's a need to have a detailed analysis of the negative role of US in this war as she tried to distort the shape of Afghan resistance (Jihad) and also endeavored to sabotage the role of ISI. (A separate books need to be written on this issue.)

Second element was drugs. This is no hidden secret now that drugs played a vital role in forming the foreign policy of America. Very cleverly they used drugs as a weapon to destroy our cultural and moral values.  We had reports that DLO Officers from America, Canada and other Western countries' consulates had instead established their own supremacy and loitered in every part of Pakistan without the permission of our interior ministry. They had deployed a huge network of spies all around, who spied and gathered information freely which had no link to anti-drug. In order to achieve their heinous goals, they carried practices of blackmailing to giving heavy bribes and worked against Pakistan freely. 

International dealers of drugs were planned to be apprehended by a method in which a selected 'carrier' would be sent out with a small amount of drugs and later the entire gang of drug dealers would be caught with the help of America and Europe. But the officers responsible for dealing with the anti-narcotics kept sending big amounts of drugs with the carriers instead of smaller ones. Moreover they them self kept light a hand on drugs and took their desired amount whenever they felt like. In this way they played a sinister game and celebrated international monopoly on drugs. Our helplessness was so pitiable that none of the agency was allowed to check the 'carriers'. 

A very major part of the American aid being used in the sacred Afghanistan war comprised of the amount which came from the sales of drugs on international level. America was using paid agents to promote use of drugs in Pakistan through this money. Under the umbrella of these activities, US plotted a sinister game of deploying heroine in every corner of Pakistan and this is a crystal clear evidence of America's 'deep friendship' and 'heart-felt sympathies' towards Pakistan. In 1979-80 America started Pakistani aid in order to control narcotics when poppy plant was harvested on a very scanty scale. Poor farmers grew this plant on a domestic scale to fulfill the needs of their area. But under the facade of this aid, through Bureau of International Narcotics, US covertly started providing the harvesters with latest technology, facilities, pesticides, fertilizers etc plus giving them giant amounts of 'white' and 'brown' gold in order to help increase the yield of 'Poppy plant'. US used secret agents for this task. 

Currently in local and international market, tens of thousands of 'noble' men are indulged in the trade of drugs and in Pakistan alone, the number of people addicted to drugs has exceeded 30k. 

Doctors say that drugs can be used as a healer and comforter against pains and sorrows. That's why it is named as 'atom for comfort'. It is pathetic that due to the defective policies of Drug enforcement Agency and negative  American planning, we could never utilize the God gifted nature in a productive way. Although it is the same beneficial plant which can be used to attain  healthy elements like morphine, codeine, dopipanone etc instead of producing heroine. Had we been yielding these elements from poppy plant, Pakistan could have earned exchange worth thousands of dollars per anum through its trade in global market of medicine. We would have not needed to take loans from IMF and World Bank. But the dream of prosperity and happiness of Pakistani nation could never be fulfilled due to the courtesy of external and internal 'well-wishers'. 

Anyhow after receiving those reports about Bob,  even though we took him into close scrutiny yet our accomplices couldn't gather any beneficial information about Bob except noting the number plates of the cars that used to come and go frequently to his house and Bob's visits. At last, we decided to deploy spying equipments inside Bob's house secretly to track his conversations. Although this decision was quite sensitive and critical in nature and could put us at stake, however we vowed to take this risk. 

Thereupon when Bob was at his office one day, one of our men entered his house very cleverly. He was utterly dumbfounded when he came to see extremely valuable and latest rifles, guns, pistols and cameras present in the closets of his bedroom and side rooms. In one of his bathrooms an active wireless set was fixed. He also found a wallet under Bob's pillow which might be forgotten there in haste. In this wallet was kept his CIA's identity card. Our team mate took snaps of the entire house and captured the snaps of his ID card too and kept it in its place safely. He then fixed the Spying equipment secretly and returned silently. 

Now the question arose whether all this artillery & equipment were collected in connection to anti-narcotics & drugs or whether Bob himself was involved in trade of ammunition. We had no answer to this question but one thing was for sure. Bob was involved in some illegitimate activity. We compiled a detailed report constituting the snaps as evidences and forwarded to General Zia, urging him to deport Bob on basis of an unwanted/disliked person. After a span of few days, we received a response that President of Pakistan discussed the issue with foreign office and our foreign office wants us to let go of the issue. At present, there are many "Bobs" working in Pakistan and we can not kick out each one of them because we can not afford displeasing America at the moment. Therefore it is demanded that ISI need not waste its time on Bob. Our DG ISI General Akhter Abdur Rehman's reaction to this answer was appreciable. At no cost did he want to close his eyes at the suggestion of foreign office. For many days we exchanged thoughts on this issue, many strategies were discussed. At last General said, "Keeping this confidential that we are proceeding with this issue, do whatever you wish to, but be very cautious of being caught at any stage."

After this command of General, we devised a detailed plan and demonstrated to him which was then approved. That plan was as follows: 

At the backside of Bob's bungalow was situated an unpopulated, deserted small piece of land which had grown several wild bushes and plants. Many such vacant plots are present in Islamabad. According to our plan, we dug a deep trench on the vacant plot until it met the outer wall of Bob's house and covered it with grass and bushes. We informed the local police that we have noticed suspicious men loitering on the streets of Islamabad in the darkness of night. We suspect a gang of terrorists planning a major assault. Additionally we informed the police that we suspect guns and ammunition being used in assaults are hidden around. We tasked one of our team equipped team members to stay with the police and come along with the police at the place of occurrence on our call. 

Meanwhile, we would keep an eye on Bob's movements. Suddenly one day he flew off Pakistan and our plan came to hold. When he returned to Pakistan, day and timing of the project were finalized. In final stages of our plan, acting team members were deployed on their corresponding places. ISI agents first of all collected all the guns and ammunition silently and piled up in the trench. Bob left his office and moved towards his house as in routine. We gave an indication to proceed to the police. The concerned ISI officer reached the spot of occurrence in the presence of police force. When police reached the trench, it made the entire area attentive with the noise of its alarms. In the meanwhile, Bob had also reached his home and parked his car in the garage. On seeing all this noise in the backyard of his house, he showed up to inquire about the scene. The unexpected backdrop span his head. Police had been collecting all the artillery from the backside of his house. Duty Magistrate had even started forming a list of all the ammunition. On looking his cameras and ammunition lying around, Bob turned pale but entered his home quietly. 

On this issue it was sufficient to shut US consulate's mouth. Therefore in next two days Bob had left Pakistan. 

Our next victim was a teacher of American International School Islamabad, named Regan Cleig. He not only did trade of weaponry but had also established a workshop in his house. Dealing with Cleig was not difficult for us. Because of the sole reason that he was not a diplomat. We caught him through a common plan and compelled him to pack up his business and clean Pakistan from his dirty existence. But the fact is that there are so many 'Bobs' and 'Cleigs' in every corner of Pakistan that it is practically not possible for any agency to screw them off and clean Pakistan from them. Pakistan's protection is the sole duty of every Pakistani. It is vital to notify every Bob and Cleig around you and report the suspect to a responsible agency in order to wipe of the enemy agents from our beautiful land. Attraction of a few dollars may shake many feet and the internal evil might persuade you for traitorship... But alas! May we never be sold out to these traders of death!

Written by: Brigadier Retd. Syed Ahmed Irshad Tirmizi (ISI)
Translated by Xharaf Vsm  

Note: The original article was written in Urdu and can be found here

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Ten lessons the USZ should learn from Afghanistan’s history

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Afghanistan provides all too many examples of the wisdom of Winston Churchill’s saying “those that fail to learn from history, are doomed to repeat it.” Great Britain forgot the hard-learned lessons from the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42) and got caught in the misadventure of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80). The Afghan Communist government that took power in a military coup in 1978 did not appear to have learned from the failed westernization and reform experiment of King Amanullah (1919-29); it imposed radical changes and engaged in brutal repression, quickly stirring up a violent reaction that threatened the new regime. The Soviet Union optimistically viewed its military intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979 as a limited action with a short time horizon-assumptions that proved unfounded and whose lack of realism would have been apparent from a review of Afghan history. And it does not seem that the United States and its NATO allies reflected on lessons from the Soviet occupation when they initiated the international military intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11, even though, as Bruce Riedel noted: “A country rarely fights the same war twice in one generation, especially from opposite sides. Yet that in many ways describes the U.S. role in Afghanistan today.”

Afghanistan and its international partners now face a challenging process of international military drawdown and transition-in security, political, financial, and economic spheres. What can be learned from Afghanistan’s history to inform and help guide this process? A recent paper outlines parallels and contrasts between past and present, and distills some historical themes and lessons that may be relevant for the current transition and beyond. It focuses on the change of Soviet strategy and its military withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986-89) and the subsequent Soviet-backed Najibullah regime (1989-92). Of course, any lessons from history must be applied cautiously, in full cognizance of the current situation and major differences from the past. Nevertheless, findings of the paper do shed light on themes and lessons from Afghanistan’s history that could inform current transition planning and the path ahead.

First, it is necessary to clear up some myths and misconceptions. Afghanistan is a geographically well-defined country, whose borders were formed during a long period of conflicts and resistance against outside powers, most notably the British and Russian Empires. Dating from 1747, the country has a far longer history as a distinct national entity with continuity to the present than most of its neighbors-such as Pakistan, created in 1947 with artificially demarcated borders in two separate parts, or the central Asian states to the north formed after the break-up of the USSR at the end of 1991. Unlike some of its neighbors, Afghanistan has never had a significant secessionist movement. And the 1933-73 period shows that the country can be stable and effectively governed. The Afghan monarchial state did not penetrate deeply into the countryside, nor was it very successful developmentally, but it did keep the peace and maintain order, was perceived as legitimate internally and externally, maintained reasonable control over its borders, exercised independent diplomacy in a difficult region, and limited and monitored the activities of foreigners within the country-basic state functions which subsequent Afghan governments have struggled to fulfill.

Second, expectations about the pace of progress need to be kept modest. Whether domestically or externally driven, overly ambitious reform efforts with unrealistically short timeframes-particularly those disturbing established power relations in rural areas and affecting religion, culture, and the role of women-have led to sharp domestic reactions that set back development, sometimes for decades.

Third, the possibility of Afghanistan’s neighbors playing “spoiler” roles and of regional rivalries undermining transition is very real. Historical experience and the current situation in Pakistan indicate that there may be a need to plan around, or at a minimum for contingency planning, with respect to Pakistan for example preventing a meaningful peace agreement with the Taliban. Iran and to a lesser extent other regional countries may also raise issues for the transition. More generally, the Soviet withdrawal period shows both the difficulties in reaching a peaceful solution to a conflict during military withdrawal, and the adverse consequences of failure to do so.

Fourth, Afghanistan’s history has been characterized by chronic succession problems and associated conflict. Indeed not since 1933, and only three times since 1747, was there a smooth succession from one ruler to the next. Of the eight leaders of Afghanistan during 1973-2001, all but one died violent deaths or were ousted/exiled from power. Thus history highlights the challenges associated with the 2014 political transition and underlines the need for effective election preparations and a political strategy to maximize the prospects for smooth elections. If successful and not followed by post-election violence, the next Presidential election would comprise an unprecedented peaceful transfer of government leadership in Afghanistan’s recent history.

Fifth, the post-Soviet withdrawal period shows the potential and limitations of Afghan security forces: holding onto Kabul and other large cities is probably the most that can be hoped for. Indeed, more risks may be associated with the Afghan National Army during and after the current transition given greater ethnic factionalization; parts of the ANA could fragment or desert earlier rather than later, whereas the post-Soviet Afghan army held together reasonably well until near the end.

Sixth, the Soviet and post-Soviet experience with arming and paying militias suggests that this approach is fraught with danger, risking instability given dependence on payments to militia leaders and exacerbating grievances and drivers of conflict due to predatory behavior of many militias. A “political marketplace” as seen in some African countries, where factionalized and short-term patronage is used for political and security management to hold together different ethnic groups and regional interests, and where deals reached can be-and frequently are-re-opened including through violence, is unstable and does not provide a good foundation for successful transition or sustained political progress.

Seventh, effective Afghan leadership, pursuing a national agenda, has been critical for achieving positive outcomes in times of change and transition in Afghanistan, including foreign military withdrawals. International experience also underlines the importance of effective national leadership during transitions, as emphasized in the 2011 World Development Report Conflict, Security, and Development.

Eighth, Afghanistan during most of its history has depended on outside financial support in various forms, and the current transition and following period will be no exception. While aid certainly can and should decline from the extraordinarily high levels seen in recent years, abruptly stopping or suddenly cutting back support would be a recipe for disaster, as occurred most notably in 1991-92 when the Soviet Union in its final days stopped all support to the Najibullah regime and it quickly collapsed.

Ninth, the Afghan economy currently is in much better shape than during the Soviet and post-Soviet period, having seen recovery and rapid growth over the past decade in contrast to the widespread destruction of infrastructure and the rural economic base and massive displacement of population during the 1980s and early 1990s. In coming years the destabilizing effects of a deep economic contraction must be avoided, which will depend on maintaining political stability, avoiding deterioration in security, and building confidence, as well as gradual rather than abrupt declines in international aid.

Finally, it is also important not to overlearn some apparent lessons from history. For example, Afghanistan’s problematic experience over the past five decades with divisive, ideologically and ethnically driven political parties has made political parties in general an anathema to many Afghans. But effective political parties are an essential ingredient in successful democracies around the world, and a signal failure of the post-2001 period has been that more nationally oriented political parties have not emerged and developed.

In conclusion, some lessons from Afghanistan’s turbulent history constitute warnings and cautionary themes about what can go wrong. This reflects the reality of the country’s history, and both Afghans and international partners should move forward with eyes open so problems and risks can be managed better and mitigated to the extent possible. Certainly Afghanistan, the region, and the world cannot afford a repeat of the disastrous history of the 1990s-a worst-case outcome whose ramifications and damaging effects continue to be felt to this day. All parties must make strong efforts to ensure that such a repetition of history is avoided.

By William Byrd
He is a visiting senior expert at the United States Institute of Peace. The views expressed here are his own.

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Uzbekistan Quits Russia's NATO

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Uzbekistan has suspended its participation in a Russia-dominated security pact of ex-Soviet nations. Uzbekistan has suspended its participation in a Russia-dominated security pact of ex-Soviet nations, officials said Thursday, a move that reflected tensions inside the grouping.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization's spokesman, Vladimir Zainetdinov, said Thursday that it received a note from Uzbekistan declaring the suspension of its involvement in the seven-nation alliance. Zainetdinov wouldn't comment on possible motives behind the move, and Uzbek officials couldn't be reached for comment. The grouping also includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Russia has touted the CSTO as an ex-Soviet response to NATO, but the pact has remained amorphous and weakened by differences among its members. The pact members created a joint rapid reaction force that held sporadic maneuvers, but its numbers were small and its mission unclear.

Uzbekistan has refrained from contributing its troops to the force in an apparent reluctance to give Russia too much clout. Uzbekistan left the grouping once before in 1999, but returned in 2006, reflecting its strongman ruler's often unpredictable decisions.

Uzbek President Islam Karimov was the country's Communist Party boss and stayed at its helm after the 1991 Soviet collapse. He has ruled the resource-rich, strategically-placed Central Asian nation of 27 million with an iron fist, tolerating no dissent. International rights groups list Uzbekistan among the world's most corrupt and repressive nations.

Over the past two decades, the 74-year old Karimov has maneuvered between Russia and the West, periodically shifting loyalties.

Karimov allowed the United States of Zionism to use a major air base for the war in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, but he fell out with the USZ and other Western nations after violently cracking down on a 2005 uprising in the city of Andijan and moved to boost ties with Moscow. In recent years, Karimov has sought to mend ties with the West while Uzbekistan's relations with Russia have grown colder.

Vladimir Zharikhin, a Moscow-based political expert studying the ex-Soviet nations, told the RIA Novosti news agency that Uzbekistan's decision had been prompted by "Karimov's intention to flirt with the USZ" He added that the Uzbek leader later may again lurch in the opposite direction.

Also under Karimov, Uzbekistan's ties with its Central Asian neighbors often have been strained amid a series of disputes over borders and water-sharing. In Tajikistan, head of the parliamentary defense committee Amirkul Azimov criticized Uzbekistan's move.

"Uzbekistan's decision doesn't help collective security in the region," he was quoted as saying by RIA Novosti. Azimov said that the planned withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan would leave a "hornet's nest" threatening Central Asia.

Nikolai Fedoryak, a deputy chief of the defense and security committee in the upper house of the Russian parliament, also said that Uzbekistan may regret its decision after USZ and other forces leave Afghanistan as scheduled by the end of 2014.

"It's regrettable that Uzbekistan made that move without a thorough analysis of its consequences," he told the Interfax news agency.

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