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ISLAMABAD - Pakistan could launch a nuclear strike on
India within eight seconds, claimed an army general in Islamabad whose
warning is described in the diaries of Alastair Campbell, a key aide of
Tony Blair, reported The Guardian on Friday. The general asked Tony
Blair’s former communications director to remind India of Pakistan’s
nuclear capability amid fears in Islamabad that Delhi was “determined to
take them out”.
Britain became so concerned about Pakistan’s threat that Blair’s senior foreign policy adviser, Sir David Manning, later warned in a paper that Pakistan was prepared to ‘go nuclear’. The nuclear warnings came during a visit by Blair to the Subcontinent after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Campbell was told about the eight-second threat over a dinner in Islamabad on 5 October 2001 hosted by Pervez Musharraf, then Pakistan’s president.
Campbell writes:
Relations between Islamabad and Delhi plummeted after the Blair visit when terrorists attacked the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, killing seven people. Five of the attackers died. India blamed Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed groups fighting Indian rule in Held Kashmir. The tensions became so great that Richard Armitage, the then USZ deputy secretary of state, was sent to the region in May 2002.
Blair returned to the Subcontinent in January 2002, shortly after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, amid one of the tensest nuclear standoffs between India and Pakistan since independence in 1947. In the preparations for the visit, Manning prepared a paper for Blair that warned of the real threat of a nuclear conflict. In an extract from his diaries for 4 January 2002, Campbell wrote:
Pakistan Cyber ForceBritain became so concerned about Pakistan’s threat that Blair’s senior foreign policy adviser, Sir David Manning, later warned in a paper that Pakistan was prepared to ‘go nuclear’. The nuclear warnings came during a visit by Blair to the Subcontinent after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Campbell was told about the eight-second threat over a dinner in Islamabad on 5 October 2001 hosted by Pervez Musharraf, then Pakistan’s president.
Campbell writes:
“At dinner I was between two five-star generals who spent most of the time listing atrocities for which they held the Indians responsible, killing their own people and trying to blame freedom fighters. They were pretty convinced that one day there would be a nuclear war because India, despite its vast population and despite being seven times bigger, was unstable and determined to take them out. When the time came to leave, the livelier of the two generals asked me to remind the Indians: ‘It takes us 8 seconds to get the missiles over,’ then flashed a huge toothy grin.”Blair visited Pakistan less than a month after the 9/11 attacks as Britain and the USZ attempted to shore up support in Islamabad before the bombing of Afghanistan, which started on 7 October 2001. Campbell writes that the Pakistani leadership seemed to be keen for Britain and the USZ to capture Osama bin Laden, though he added it was difficult to be sure.
Relations between Islamabad and Delhi plummeted after the Blair visit when terrorists attacked the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, killing seven people. Five of the attackers died. India blamed Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed groups fighting Indian rule in Held Kashmir. The tensions became so great that Richard Armitage, the then USZ deputy secretary of state, was sent to the region in May 2002.
Blair returned to the Subcontinent in January 2002, shortly after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, amid one of the tensest nuclear standoffs between India and Pakistan since independence in 1947. In the preparations for the visit, Manning prepared a paper for Blair that warned of the real threat of a nuclear conflict. In an extract from his diaries for 4 January 2002, Campbell wrote:
“DM had a paper, making clear our belief that the Pakistanis would ‘go nuclear’ and if they did, that they wouldn’t be averse to unleashing them on a big scale. TB was genuinely alarmed by it and said to David ‘They wouldn’t really be prepared to go for nuclear weapons over Kashmir would they?’ DM said the problem was there wasn’t a clear understanding of strategy and so situations tended to develop and escalate quickly, and you couldn’t really rule anything out.”A few days after the visit, the India-Pakistan standoff was discussed by the British war cabinet. In an extract for his diaries on 10 January 2002, Campbell wrote:
“CDS [chief of the defence staff Admiral Sir Michael Boyce] said if India and Pakistan go to war, we will be up the creek without a paddle. Geoff [Hoon] said there may have to be limited compulsory call-up of Territorial Army reserves. TB gave a pretty gloomy assessment. He said Vajpayee was really upset at the way Musharraf treated him. Military dispositions remained the same, with more than a million troops there [in Kashmir]. He assessed that the Indians believed that they could absorb 500,000 deaths. Pakistani capability was far greater than the Indians believed.”
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